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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we address the following issues: whether and how 
the UK has influenced EU competition policy, what EU competition 
law and policy might have been without the UK’s membership, and 
the consequences Brexit is likely to have on this policy field. 
The main challenge in addressing the first set of questions is 
methodological: what sources best show the influence of a given 
Member State to the policies of the Union? What might be said to be 
the distinctly British approach to a policy field like competition law? 
Even answering these questions does not necessarily solve all 
problems, for then one has to work out how British preferences get 
transmitted in a complex decision-making process which is led by the 
Commission as a policy entrepreneur, but often mediated via a range 
of exchanges across a range of institutions.1 Thus, in Part IIa we start 
by reviewing the methodological choices that were made to identify 
how one might go about tracing British influence. A second 
preliminary issue discussed in Part IIb is on how to identify what one 
means by ‘Britishness’ in the context of competition law. 
Assessments of British competition law before accession are at best 
ambivalent about the overall institutional design and suggest that the 
policy behind the various legislative efforts showed little coherence.2 
As discussed in Part IV, it was the UK who copied the EU’s 
competition regime in 1998, so it may be more fruitful to see how far 
the UK’s implementation of the EU regime may both show some 
specific British features and tell us something of what the UK may 
have contributed to the EU since that time. 
Having identified methods for studying the questions we assess 
British influences in Part III by considering the role of two senior 
British officials: Sir Leon Brittan and Francis Jacobs. Their work 
suggests that there are certain features to the British approach to 
competition law (focus on economic effects and a skepticism of state 
intervention) that are distinct from those espoused by others. We then 
                                                                                                                       
* Professor of Competition Law, European University Institute. With thanks to Barry 
Hawk, Fernanda Nicola and Heike Schweitzer for helpful comments. All errors remain mine. 
1.  For an example in the field of energy policy, see T. Maltby ‘European Union energy 
policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing 
supranationalism’ 55 Energy Policy 435 (2013). 
2.  See D.J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE 207-26 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For a more critical assessment, see H. MERCER, 
CONSTRUCTING A COMPETITIVE ORDER (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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turn to the enforcement of competition law since 2000 and note a 
similar tone when courts and public officials apply EU competition 
law. 
II. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Sources 
It is well established that the introduction of the rules of 
competition in the Treaty of Rome was the result of requests from the 
United States with strong support from German scholars and 
officials.3 However the umbilical cord with the US was cut early on 
and EU competition law enforcement developed a distinctive 
European flavor. The procedural rules established in Regulation 17/62 
centralized power in the Commission, with little space for private 
enforcement; 4  the substantive interpretation of the rules on 
competition between the 1960s and the mid-1980s is often said to 
have been ‘formalistic’ in the EU, while increasingly effects-based in 
the United States. 5 
The historical records have traced American and German 
influence in the early years. 6  It is harder to pinpoint the precise 
contribution that the UK has made to competition law and policy 
since its entry into the common market in 1973, because there are few 
sources that allow us to examine this. In other fields of EU Law, 
where progress is made by the drafting of secondary legislation or 
where certain national courts can determine the development of EU 
law, it may be easier to determine the influence of a given Member 
State. For example in a field closely related to competition policy, the 
construction of the internal market, the influence of a British civil 
                                                                                                                       
3.   W. WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002); K.K. PATEL & H. SCHWEITZER, THE HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
4.   Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, 
at 87 
5.   For an early contribution in this regard, see B.E. Hawk, The American (antitrust) 
revolution: lessons for the EEC?, 9 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 53 (1988). 
6 .  G. Marenco, The Birth of Modern Competition Law in Europe, in EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF CLAUS-
DIETER EHLERMANN (A. von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2002) (reviewing the preparatory works); 
L. VAN MIDDELAAR, THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE: HOW A CONTINENT BECAME A UNION 160-
61 (Yale University Press, 2013) (discussing Germany’s role in the first procedural 
regulation). 
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servant, Lord Cockfield, is undoubted. 7  Indeed after the Prime 
Minister’s speech on 17 January 2017 some remarked that her wish to 
exit the single market is striking because it is seen as a British 
creation. 8  We would be hard pressed to find traces of any 
jurisdiction’s influence in antitrust that are as marked as this, save 
perhaps for the influence of Germany in the early years, which is 
characterized by the role that a number of senior figures from 
Germany played in the early days in the negotiations of the Treaty of 
Rome and within the Commission.9 
The important influence of German officials inspires the first 
method deployed here: to look at the two key institutions responsible 
for developing competition policy (the Commission and the Court) 
and ask how far British members have played a decisive role in 
shaping the field. Whether this method yields useful insights may be 
questioned. The numbers of Commissioners and judges whose work 
we can review is limited: there has been only one British competition 
commissioner and the Court rules as a collegiate body so working out 
the role of individual judges is invidious. We can identify the 
approach of Advocates General but it is not always clear how much of 
their approach is followed by the Court. Moreover focusing on 
individuals ignores the work of more junior civil servants and 
référendaires, who may be said to have an equally important role in 
the background of policy making. Having said that, two figures stand 
out whose contribution to the European Union project can hardly be 
doubted and who have had an important impact on competition law: 
the late Sir Leon Brittan (Commissioner for competition between 
1989 and 1993) and Sir Francis Jacobs (Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice of the European Union from 1988 to 2006). This is 
not to say that other Advocates General from the UK have not had a 
similar influence on competition law, but for present purposes we 
                                                                                                                       
7.  Margaret Thatcher’s reminiscences on Lord Cockfield are worth recording: ‘I always 
paid tribute to the contribution he made to the Single Market.’ But then she also went on to 
note that as the project developed, ‘[i]t was too easy for him… to go native and to move from 
deregulating the market to reregulating it under the rubric of harmonisation.’ MARGARET 
THATCHER, THE DOWNING STREET YEARS 547 (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993); 
see also D. Edward, The British Contribution to the Development of Law and Legal Process in 
the European Union, in THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUROPE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 28-9 (B. Markesinis ed., 2002). 
8.  M. Emerson, Theresa May’s Brexit Speech of 17 January 2017 – Decoding its clarity 
and ambiguity, CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017/01 (January 25 2017). 
9.  See A.C. WITT, THE MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO EU ANTITRUST LAW 85-6 
(Bloomsbury/Hart, 2016) and the sources cited therein. 
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focus on one member of the court.10 His background and length of 
service combine to suggest that his Opinions are likely to have had 
greater influence than Advocates General who lack these attributes.11 
Second, we turn to British competition law. One might 
reasonably think that this would be a useful starting point to trace 
British influences, for it would allow one to determine what the 
British understanding of competition law had been and to then try and 
trace how far this understanding was shifted to Brussels or 
Luxembourg. However, this exercise reveals something else: it is the 
EU that influenced the UK, in particular since the Labour government 
took office in 1997. Moreover, given the paucity of enforcement 
action by the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) first and the 
Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) now, it is also quite 
hard to see what a particularly British view of competition law is all 
about even today. At the same time, in judgments of the British courts 
and in some enforcement activities of the OFT and CMA we can 
detect what will be labeled as ‘critical deference’ to the approach to 
competition law found in the EU institutions. This has never led to a 
major fracture between the British and the EU approach, and only a 
competition law specialist would notice the subtle differences 
between the two systems. Yet, the themes that arise from these 
divergences are aligned to the themes that emerge from the analysis 
of the work of Brittan and Jacobs. 
B. Britishness 
In trying to ground the above materials around the theme of 
Britishness, we can draw on two strands of debate about the role of 
competition. The first is the widely discussed and often contested 
                                                                                                                       
10.  One might also discuss David Edward. For instance, he was the reporting judge in 
two of the major judgments that explore the concept of collective dominance. See Compagnie 
Maritime Belge SA et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases C-395/96 P & C-396/96 P, [2000] 
E.C.R. I-1442; Società Italiana Vetro SpA et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases T-68/89, T-
77/89, & T-78/89, [1992] E.C.R. II-1405; see also M. Clough, Collective Dominance: The 
Contribution of the Community Courts, in TRUE EUROPEAN – ESSAYS FOR JUDGE DAVID 
EDWARD (M. Hoskins & W. Robinson eds., 2003) (noting that these two were seminal 
judgments, but that the focus has now shifted to exploring oligopolistic interdependence under 
the merger rules, and there has been no appetite to explore the notion of abuse of collective 
dominance under Article 102 since these two judgments). 
11.  See U. Šadl & S. Sankari, The elusive influence of the AG on the Court of Justice: 
the case of European citizenship, YEARBOOK OF EUR. L. (forthcoming) whose research 
suggests that Advocates General who are former academics and who are senior members of 
the Court are more likely to be followed. 
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divide in EU antitrust: between those who would like the system to 
look more to the economic effects and those who take the view that 
competition law safeguards the competitive process. It will be clear 
from the findings below that the British have more sympathy for the 
former, and this is evidenced by the positions taken by Brittan and Sir 
Francis as well as by the approach taken by the OFT and the CMA 
since 2000.12 
The second debate that allows one to explore what might be the 
distinctively British view rests on the different sort of capitalism 
espoused in the UK as opposed to the continent.13 Transposing the 
literature on varieties of capitalism into the antitrust context, we can 
suggest that in a liberal market economy (like the UK) privatization 
and efficiency are seen as the key benchmarks in testing the 
performance of markets, and that this framework should extend to 
public services. It is agreed that in the field of telecommunications for 
example, it was the British who engaged in liberalization first and 
offered a model for how to open the market to competition, even if it 
is suggested that they did not offer leadership when the EU embarked 
upon the long path to liberalization.14  In contrast, the Continental 
view considers that the state has a central role to play in delivering 
public services, with little space for competition.15 
Finally, one might examine how far British common law 
methods filtered through as a result of British lawyers or judges. 
However, we can leave this discussion to a more general discussion 
on the Court of Justice of the European Union and identify only one 
salient episode: the recognition of legal and professional privilege by 
                                                                                                                       
12.  R. Nazzini, A Welfare—Based Competition Policy Under Structuralist Constraints: 
Abuse of Dominance and OFT Practice, in TEN YEARS OF UK COMPETITION LAW REFORM 
(B.J. Rodger ed., Dundee University Press 2010). 
13.  See generally VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
14.  See EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALISATION 45 (Kjell A. Eliassen & 
Marit Sjovaag eds., Routledge 1999). 
15.  For a general discussion of the UK versus the Continental approaches and the 
management of the tension at EU level, see TONY PROSSER, THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION 
LAW – MARKETS AND PUBLIC SERVICES (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). For a 
French perspective, see C. Haguenau-Moizard, ‘Servizi di interesse generale e servizio 
pubblico “alla francese”: dal confronto al ravvicinamento’ in E. FERRARI (ED.) ATTIVITÀ 
ECONOMICHE ED ATTIVITÀ SOCIALI NEI SERVIZI DI INTERESSE GENERALE (E. Ferrari, Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2007). 
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the Court of Justice in AM&S.16 It is said that this principle emerged 
as a result of British lawyers’ pleas and the Court was advised by the 
first British AG (Jean-Pierre Warner); however this ruling has not 
been universally welcomed because the Court held that advice from 
independent lawyers was privileged but advice from in-house lawyers 
was not. Moreover, the AG and Court did not extract this principle 
solely from British law but drew, as is often the case, from the 
traditions of all the Member States. Still on common law and on AG 
Warner’s tenure, it has been noted that he led certain other 
developments that come straight from a common law background: he 
engaged lawyers in discussion at oral hearings and cited ‘precedent’ 
more frequently than other advocates general at the time.17  These 
influences on court procedure, while relevant for competition 
litigation, are left outside the scope of this discussion. 
III. BRITISH INFLUENCES ON EU COMPETITION LAW 
A. Sir Francis Jacobs 
Sir Francis Jacobs has been among the longest serving 
Advocates General, rendering 588 opinions, of which 50 in 
competition law cases.18 One commentator suggested that he was AG 
in many of the leading competition law cases during his tenure.19 His 
Opinions have a number of features that make them stand out: the 
clear way his Opinions begin with a brief, clear explanation of the 
issues at stake, his willingness to refer to foreign law, 20  and the 
                                                                                                                       
16.  See AM & S Europe Ltd. v Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575. See the 
amusing account of the background in J. Lever ‘Foreword’ in M. HOSKINS & W. ROBINSON, A 
TRUE EUROPEAN – ESSAYS FOR JUDGE DAVID EDWARD xii-xiii (Oxford: Hart Publishing 
2004). 
17.  See NOREEN BURROWS & ROSA GREAVES, THE AG AND EC LAW 167-68 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). The authors explore how far this AG impacted upon 
competition law, and one of their principal findings is his interest in safeguarding the rights of 
the defense. They see this as the result of his background. Unfortunately the authors did not 
discuss the AM&S judgment. 
18.  I am grateful to U. Šadl for sharing her data on which these figures draw. 
19.  See Richard Whish, Competition Law, in MAKING COMMUNITY LAW: THE LEGACY 
OF AG JACOBS AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 118 (Philip Moser & Katrine Sawyer 
eds., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
20.  Writing extra-judicially, he noted how in the Oscar Bronner case (discussed below) 
references to US antitrust were decisive. See Francis Jacobs, Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-
Fertilization of Legal Systems: The European Court of Justice, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 547, 555 
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systematic and clever handling of precedent.21 For present purposes, 
we focus on two issues: first how his Opinions demonstrated a more 
economics-based approach than the rest of the Court. This approach 
coincided with the Commission’s move in the same direction, while 
this has not yet influenced the Court completely. Second, we consider 
the many instances where he wrote Opinions in disputes concerning 
the relationship between competition law and the welfare state. 
1. The More Economic Approach 
Perhaps the most telling illustration that allows us to see the 
difference in view concerns the assessment of GlaxoSmithKline’s 
(“GSK”) conduct in Greece. In brief, the firm noted that its Greek 
wholesalers were re-selling medicines that GSK shipped to Greece to 
other markets: since prices for certain medicines are regulated in the 
various Member States, and the prices in Greece are very low, Greek 
wholesalers found it profitable to export the medicines. GSK took 
steps to limit supplies to Greek wholesalers with a view to stopping 
this conduct and the question arose if this constituted an abuse of a 
dominant position in view of GSK’s dominance in the medicines in 
question. 
The procedural story evolved as follows. First, the matter was 
taken up by the Greek Competition Commission. Unsure of certain 
aspects of Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”), the Commission made a reference for a preliminary 
ruling. AG Jacobs gave an Opinion but the Court dismissed the matter 
on procedural grounds, holding that the Greek Commission could not 
make a reference to the ECJ. Second, the matter then was the subject 
of litigation between GSK and the wholesalers in Greece and the 
Greek court made a second reference, when the ECJ finally gave an 
answer on the law.22 
                                                                                                                       
(2003); see also Ministère Public v. Tournier, Case 395/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2565, for another 
instance where US antitrust experience was referred to by AG Jacobs. 
21 .  At times perhaps too clever: in Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de 
l’Industrie v. GEMO SA, he diagnosed two conflicting strands of case law and proposed a 
hybrid test whereby both strands would apply to different facts. See Opinion of Advocate 
General Jacobs, GEMO SA, Case C-126/01, [2002] E.C.R. I-13772. Ultimately the ECJ was 
persuaded to adopt one approach and jettison the other in Altmark Trans GmbH & 
Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, Case C-280/00, 
[2003] E.C.R. I-7810. 
22.  The procedural history of this case is complicated: it reached the Court first by way 
of a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Greek competition authority. See Syfait et al. 
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The key difference between AG Jacobs and the ECJ hinges on 
the grounds upon which a refusal to supply could be justified. Jacobs 
took the view that three particular circumstances mattered: the 
regulatory context, the importance of innovation, and the role of 
wholesalers. He considered that these features militated in favor of 
giving GSK a chance to justify its otherwise abusive conduct. First, 
the regulatory context revealed that price differences among the 
Member States were the result of national regulation, so this was not a 
case where GSK was using its economic power to divide up the 
internal market; second, certain legal/moral obligations meant that 
GSK would not leave the Greek market without the required number 
of medicinal products for the wholesalers to discharge their public 
service obligations. Third, innovation is expensive and the higher 
prices that GSK is able to sell its medicines at in some states provide 
it with much needed revenue to develop new drugs – to avoid these 
losses a firm like GSK might refuse to sell new drugs in states where 
it foresees parallel imports, or it may negotiate higher prices in 
Greece, thus damaging the (already precarious) finances of that 
country and others who set low prices to buy medicines. Otherwise, 
the firms might slow down the rate of innovation. Finally he reasoned 
that given the market structure, it would only be wholesalers making 
parallel trade who would benefit from the current practice: ‘it cannot 
be assumed that parallel trade would in fact benefit either the ultimate 
consumers of pharmaceutical products or the Member States, as 
primary purchasers of such products.’23 
The Court of Justice saw things differently, in two respects: first, 
in certain parts of its judgment it considered that parallel trade could 
benefit the final consumer because the conduct of the wholesalers 
could result in some consumer benefits. Here the Court agreed with 
AG Jacobs’ policy line and differed on its assessment of the 
economics of the market. Second, the Court paid much less attention 
to the innovation argument – it subsumed it into its case law which 
                                                                                                                       
v. GlaxoSmithKline plc & GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, Case C‑53/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-4638. 
Here AG Jacobs rendered an Opinion but the Court held that the Greek competition authority 
was not entitled to make a reference. The same dispute reached the Court again as a result of 
litigation between GSK and Greek wholesalers. See Sot. Lelos kai Sia EE et al. v. 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton, Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, 
[2008] E.C.R. I-7139. AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer was none too thrilled to write this after AG 
Jacobs had already expressed his views in the earlier judgment. See Opinion of Advocate 
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Sot. Lelos kai Sia EE, [2008] E.C.R. I-7144, ¶ 1. 
23.  See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, [2004] E.C.R. I-4611. 
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provides that a dominant undertaking is entitled to reduce the 
quantities it supplies to protect its commercial interests and that this 
may be lawful if proportionate (e.g. it may be justified to refuse to sell 
a wholesaler quantities that are significantly higher than it needs for 
domestic supply and that are ‘essentially destined for parallel 
export’ 24 ) The Court’s two moves are, however, contradictory: if 
parallel trade offers the opportunity for consumer gains, then why 
tolerate a reduction in such trade on the basis that GSK is entitled to 
protect its commercial interests? If the public good protected by 
competition law is the increase in gains for consumers, how can one 
legitimately allow for a reduction in consumer welfare on the basis 
that the firm wishes to protect its commercial interests? In contrast 
AG Jacobs’ analytical stance balances competing welfare effects: 
considering the impact of the practices in question on allocative and 
dynamic efficiencies. 
This tension is merely one of many illustrations of the 
contradictions in the case law on abuse of dominance: unspecified 
theories of harm and an unclear space for justifications. AG Jacobs’ 
approach instead sought to generate a degree of coherence, while 
being very cautious. First, he indicated his dissatisfaction with the 
abuse/objective justification dichotomy: 
the very fact that conduct is characterized as an ‘abuse’ 
suggests that a negative conclusion has already been 
reached, by contrast with the more neutral terminology of 
‘prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition’ under 
Article 81 EC. In my view, it is therefore more accurate to 
say that certain types of conduct on the part of a dominant 
undertaking do not fall within the category of abuse at all.25 
The background to this statement has to do with the perception 
that, to paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart, the sole consistency in 
Article 102 cases is that the Commission always wins.26 In practical 
terms, the semantic twist he proposes is less relevant than the implicit 
call for a more careful effects-based analysis of restrictive practices. 
                                                                                                                       
24.  Sot. Lelos kai Sia EE, [2008] E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 71. 
25.  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, [2004] E.C.R. I-4611, ¶ 72. 
26.  United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966). Nearly always: The 
Court annulled abuse decisions in Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can 
Company Inc. v. Commission, Case 6-72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 and Hugin Kassregister v. 
Commission, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138. There have also been some partial 
annulments, for example United Brands Company v. Commission, Case 27/76, 
ECLI:EU:C:1978:22. 
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Moreover, the Opinion tries to explore how to craft an efficiency 
defense to justify the conduct of dominant firms. He is cautious to 
state that there are very specific facts in this case that justify the 
approach he suggests, but his analysis incorporates elements that can 
allow a decision maker to balance the welfare gains and losses from 
the conduct of the dominant firm. This approach was later followed 
by the ECJ.27 
In subsequent litigation on the same set of facts (but this time 
concerning Spanish parallel traders) we can observe a further 
development. In an appeal against a Commission decision finding that 
GSK had infringed Article 101 by agreements banning parallel trade 
the General Court considered that the appropriate test for legality is 
whether the conduct harms consumers. This appears to have been 
inspired by the approach AG Jacobs took. However, on appeal the 
Court of Justice held that this was an error of law. The true role of 
competition law was described as follows by the higher court: 
There is nothing in [Article 101 TFEU] to indicate that only 
those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages 
may have an anti-competitive object. Secondly, it must be borne 
in mind that the Court has held that, like other competition rules 
laid down in the Treaty, Article [101 TFEU] aims to protect not 
only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the 
structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.28 
This disagreement encapsulates very clearly the two visions for 
antitrust: the General Court’s approach is much more in line with the 
more economics-based analysis of restrictive practices, while the 
Court of Justice continues to find a wider set of interests that 
competition law protects. 
If we remain with refusals to deal, we can continue to find 
evidence of this clash between the two approaches by reviewing one 
of AG Jacobs’ most highly regarded Opinions: that in Oscar 
Bronner.29 This was a dispute between the owner of a newspaper who 
also operated an efficient distribution network and a rival newspaper 
                                                                                                                       
27.  British Airways v. Commission, Case C-95/04 P, [2007] E.C.R. I-2373, ¶ 86. 
28.  GlaxoSmithKline Unlimited et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-
513/06 P, C-515/06 P, & C-519/06 P, 2009, ¶ 63, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A62006CJ0501. 
29.  Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag 
GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-7817. It has been noted that many discussions 
of the case refer to the Opinion as if it were the judgment. See Whish, supra note 19, at 120. 
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who wanted to have access to the distribution network. Here too we 
can detect a small but significant difference between the approach he 
recommended and the one the Court followed. Before this judgment it 
was not clear what was required to show that a refusal to deal was an 
abuse and the question came up whether an ‘essential facilities’ 
doctrine should be crafted. AG Jacobs suggested a more restrictive 
and piecemeal approach. Rather than suggesting a formula, he pointed 
to a number of policy considerations that should be taken into 
account. First he noted that freedom of contract and property rights 
militated against an expansive application of competition law. Then 
he noted that the welfare effects of imposing an obligation to deal 
were relevant: in the short run consumers might gain but in the long 
run access rights might reduce incentives to innovate. Finally, he 
suggested that attention should be paid to the competitive conditions 
on the downstream market: if the downstream market is competitive, 
then an obligation to deal would not safeguard the interest of 
consumers, but only those of competitors.30 
The Court of Justice agreed with its AG that on the facts there 
was likely no abuse (because it was not impossible to duplicate the 
distribution network of the dominant firm).31 But it took a different 
line on the criteria to determine when a refusal to supply would be 
considered an abuse: at the very minimum the Court suggested that 
the refusal should be ‘likely to eliminate all competition in the daily 
newspaper market on the part of the person requesting the service and 
that such refusal be incapable of being objectively justified.’32 It also 
considered that the service should be indispensable. 
The key difference is subtle but significant: for AG Jacobs one 
has to show that there is harm on the downstream market, for the 
Court it suffices that the rival has no other means of accessing the 
downstream market. In most cases this makes no difference, but AG 
Jacobs would allow a defendant to justify a refusal to deal on the 
basis that the downstream market is workably competitive – the Court 
would not entertain this line of argument. 
                                                                                                                       
30.  Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG, [1998] E.C.R. I-7817, ¶ 54-62. 
31.  It is of course unusual that the Court effectively ruled on the facts when it was 
merely asked for assistance in interpreting a question of law. 
32.   Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG, [1998] E.C.R. I-7817, ¶ 41. 
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It was AG Jacobs’ approach that found its way into the 
Commission’s Guidance Paper on Article 102.33 This document was 
an attempt by the Commission to modernize its interpretation of the 
rules on exclusionary conduct along an approach that focused more 
attentively on the likely effect of conduct, and in the years leading up 
to this document, Francis Jacobs was probably the main proponent of 
a similar vision within the Court.34 
2. The Welfare State and Competition Law 
Another line of jurisprudence where AG Jacobs had a role to 
play is in the interface between competition law and the delivery of 
public services. Here the matter litigated is how far competition law 
should apply to the activities of providers of public services (in 
technical terms, whether these providers should be considered to be 
‘undertakings’ for the purposes of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), and if 
competition law applies to them, whether the fact that they must 
deliver such services affords them an exemption, on the basis that 
they provide services of general interest on the basis of Article 106(2) 
TFEU. One of AG Jacobs’ lines serves well to encapsulate his 
position to these legal questions: ‘the objective of Article [106(2) 
TFEU]… is the efficient provision of services of general economic 
interest.’35 In other words, it does not matter whether competition law 
applies or whether the firm is entitled to hold a monopoly on the 
provision of a service: either the market or the regulatory framework 
must ensure that the supplier acts efficiently. This is a far cry from the 
views of those who believe that the disapplication of competition law 
means that the provider of public services had the right to be left 
alone.36 
                                                                                                                       
33.  See Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. C 45/7, ¶¶ 81-90 (focusing on the harm to 
competition on the downstream market but not on any abstract consideration of harm to 
competition as such). 
34.  See generally Giorgio Monti, Article 82 EC: What Future for the Effects-Based 
Approach?, 1 J. OF EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 2 (2010). 
35.  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis 
Südwestpfalz, Case C-475/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-8094, ¶ 188. 
36.  Perhaps nicely illustrated by Italy v. Commission, Case 41/83, [1985] E.C.R. 880, 
¶¶ 13, 14, where Italy appealed against a decision against British Telecom on the basis that this 
was a public authority and so immune from the application of competition law. The UK 
intervened instead to support the Commission’s decision. Id.  
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Under EU Law there are two techniques by which providers of 
social welfare services can argue that competition law should not 
apply: they can claim that they are not undertakings, so that Articles 
101 and 102 are inapplicable, or they can claim that Article 106(2) 
applies to their conduct so that the competition rules should not apply 
if they would hamper the delivery of a service of general economic 
interest. AG Jacobs was involved in disputes concerning both lines of 
argument. 
As to the first, the Court generally followed his advice but there 
was a disagreement in AOK Bundesverband that can be used to 
illustrate the differences that a more market-oriented analysis can 
make. The dispute arose when it was discovered that the German 
sickness insurance funds agreed among themselves the maximum 
amounts they would pay for certain medicines. Was this an agreement 
under Article 101, or were the sickness funds not to be characterized 
as undertakings? The Court held that the sickness funds, which 
covered 90 per cent of the German population and which had an 
obligation to offer the same benefits to each person, were not to be 
treated as undertakings because of the exclusively social objective 
that they pursued. In agreeing the maximum amount of 
reimbursement they merely continued to pursue this objective under 
statutory guidance. 37  On the contrary AG Jacobs placed more 
emphasis on the findings that the various sickness insurance funds did 
have some space for competition among each other and that as a 
result, without the agreement they would also have been able to 
compete on the level of reimbursement offered to their clients.38 In his 
view then, the test for legality would hinge upon whether the 
agreement to restrict price competition could be justified under 
Article 106(2) TFEU as a restriction of competition necessary to 
allow the undertakings to deliver a service of general economic 
interest. 
Turning to Article 106(2) TFEU, commentators agreed that the 
Court has become increasingly lax in allowing Member States to 
plead this defense but critical as to the precise standard that the Court 
                                                                                                                       
37. AOK Bundesverband et al. v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co et al., 
Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01, and C-355/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-2524, ¶¶ 61-63. 
Query if the better analysis of this point was to rely on the state compulsion defense – that is to 
say: national law required or encouraged the agreements. 
38. Id; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, [2005] E.C.R. I-4638, ¶¶ 38-43. 
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applies.39 In parallel to this development, AG Jacobs appears to have 
requested that the Court add a condition to any decision finding that a 
restriction of competition could be tolerated on the basis that it is 
necessary to provide the service of general interest: in a judgment 
concerning the assignment of monopoly rights over the provision of 
ambulance services, he indicated that it was essential that the provider 
of the service of general interest be in a position to provide the service 
effectively. This proviso reflects his earlier understanding of the case 
law on the application of Articles 106(1) and 102 where he indicated 
that one strand of the case law shows that a state infringes these 
provisions when they grant a monopoly to a provider who is 
manifestly incapable of delivering the service in question.40 
In sum: competition and efficiency are benchmarks by which 
public service delivery is monitored, according to his Opinions. The 
Court has not always followed this approach, in that its case law tries 
to also accommodate the view of those who support greater market 
intervention in the name of social justice.41 
B. Sir Leon Brittan 
Sir Leon Brittan described his stint in Brussels in the following 
terms: ‘I like to think that my work in bulldozing through reforms 
which levered open markets, intensified competition and put public 
sector monopolists on the back foot contributed to changing the terms 
of the debate.’42 This self-assessment helps us to take into account his 
role in one of the more significant competition law reforms to which 
his name is associated: the EU Merger Regulation.43 
The EU Treaties do not regulate mergers: the Commission 
proposed a Regulation to address these transactions in 1973 but it was 
                                                                                                                       
39.   M.G. Ross, The Europeanization of Public Service Provision: Harnessing 
Competition and Citizenship?, 23 YEARBOOK OF EUR. L. 303, 310-11 (2004). 
40.   An example of his classification of the case law can be found in Albany 
International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie. See Opinion of Advocate 
General Jacobs, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 
Case C-67/96, [1999] E.C.R. I-5754.  
41 .   D. CHALMERS, G. DAVIES. & G. MONTI EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND 
MATERIALS Ch.25 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed. 2014) (available 
exclusively as an online chapter). 
42.   L. BRITTAN, A DIET OF BRUSSELS – THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPE 49-50 
(London: Little, Brown & Co, 2000).  
43 .   For a detailed personal account, see L. BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND 
MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (Cambridge, Grotius, 1991). 
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only in 1989 that a Regulation was agreed.44 Brittan identified the 
main stumbling block: certain Member States wished to retain 
competence over mergers because they saw this power as a way of 
exercising national policies (e.g. industrial, regional or social policies 
could be implemented by allowing or blocking certain transactions). 
Others were convinced that having a single merger regulator for the 
EU would be preferable as a way of facilitating cross-border 
acquisitions. The way this divide was managed is twofold: first the 
scope of application of the Regulation was reduced (so that only very 
large mergers would fall within the scope of Commission scrutiny) 
and the substantive test by which to assess mergers was left 
ambiguous, so the battle as to whether one should control mergers 
only when they had a negative impact on welfare or whether other 
public interest considerations could play a role was left for another 
day, when the regulation would have to be applied.45 
The confrontation happened in the well-known de Havilland 
merger.46 In brief, two state owned companies (French Aerospatiale 
and Italy’s Alenia) wished to buy a Canadian firm, de Havilland. 
Together they would have held a dominant position in the market for 
mid-sized aircraft but supporters of the merger saw this as an 
occasion to create a European Champion. There was considerable 
political jostling to secure sufficient votes at the Commission to block 
the transaction, where Brittan played a major role to convince 
undecided Commissioners.47 This was said to have solved the debate 
in favour of an economics-based welfare standard. Since then, 
according to Brittan the Commission’s merger decisions have focused 
on ‘pure competition considerations.’48 This is not to say that at times 
mergers might be cleared for political reasons that may have to do 
with domestic policies or EU industrial policies, but it is hard to 
detect more than a handful of instances where this might have 
occurred. For example, in recent years the consolidation of the 
                                                                                                                       
44.  See generally M. ARMSTRONG & S. BULMER, THE GOVERNANCE OF THE SINGLE 
EUROPEAN MARKET Ch.4 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 
45.  The final text is Council Regulation (ECC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on 
the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. L 257/13. 
46.  Commission Decision No. 91/619/EEC (Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland), 1991 
O.J. L 334/42. 
47.  For an engaging account, see G. ROSS JACQUES DELORS AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 178 (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994). 
48.  See Brittan, supra note 42. For a slightly different assessment, see G. MONTI, EC 
COMPETITION LAW 6-12 (2007). 
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telecoms market was accompanied by significant lobbying by the 
large players, and one might wonder how effective this has been.49 
When examining Britain’s contribution we should distinguish 
two aspects: first did he make the Regulation happen? Here he had a 
good dose of other circumstances that made agreement possible: a 
huge increase in merger activity in the run up to the finalization of the 
single market, meaning that industry supported the initiative strongly, 
and a significant judgment from the Court of Justice indicating that 
certain mergers might be regulated under Article 101.50 This case 
would have given the Commission powers to vet mergers on the basis 
of Regulation 17/62 and thus Member States were keen to negotiate a 
solution that would allow them to have some influence in the outcome 
of EU-wide merger control rules. Second, how far was the 
competition-focus of the test for mergers due to Brittan’s influence? 
A review of the negotiations by Hubert Buch-Hansen suggests that 
there were other actors who also supported this, largely due to the 
convergence towards what he calls a neo-liberal agenda for EU 
integration.51 Form his perspective Brittan was not then ‘bulldozing’ 
market-based reforms but was bringing together a range of views 
about how the economy should be run that were aligned with the 
perspective of liberal market economies, which had by then managed 
to secure pre-eminence. 
We can perhaps generalize from this example: it seems clear that 
for most EU level reforms one Member State can hardly ever claim to 
do more than inspire a general direction, but that a partnership among 
EU institutions and Member States is essential to yield a tangible 
result.52 Nevertheless, it seems that Brittan’s push (both in getting the 
Regulation through, and in persuading a slim majority of 
Commissioners to block the de Havilland merger) was essential. 
                                                                                                                       
49.  T. Barber, Lines are crossed on benefits of telecom consolidation, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (27 Apr. 2016). 
50.  See generally British American Tobacco Co. Ltd et al. v. Commission et al., Joined 
Cases 142/84 & 156/84, [1987] E.C.R. 4566. 
51. See generally H. Buch-Hansen, Rethinking the History of European Level Merger 
Control: A Critical Political Economy Perspective (Aug. 2008), available at: 
http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/7729/hubert_buch-hansen.pdf. 
52. See, for example Mark Thatcher who has shown that the liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector was the result of a partnership among a range of EU and national 
actors and was not the result of the Commission single-handedly acting as a policy 
entrepreneur. Mark Thatcher, The Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC 
Regulatory Expansion in Telecommunications 1979-2000, 8 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 558 
(2001). 
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C. British Competition Law 
It is probably safe to say that before the enactment of the 
Competition Act 1998, the UK’s own competition rules made little 
impression in mainland Europe. Here is Sir Francis Jacobs’ pithy 
assessment: ‘[t]he effectiveness of EC competition policy can be 
contrasted with earlier UK approaches. The UK’s system was 
formalistic, toothless and out of keeping with the newer economic 
thinking, in the United Kingdom as well as in Europe.’53 Indeed, the 
interesting story from the perspective of the ongoing Brexit 
discussion is the voluntary import of EU competition law by the UK, 
to which we now turn. 
There had been a number of attempts to amend UK competition 
law to bring it into line with the rules applied by the EU, not least 
because this would make life easier for firms whose conduct would be 
tested under both EU and UK rules. However successive 
Conservative governments hesitated – according to some scholars this 
was purely based on a concern about what voters might say to the UK 
borrowing EU rules.54 It took until Blair’s New Labour government 
for the Competition Act 1998 to emerge: this statute aligns UK 
antitrust to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Moreover, section 60 
provides for a convergence rule by which EU Law is a source of law 
to interpret UK antitrust. Finally, the Competition Appeals Tribunal 
(the first instance court where appeals against decisions of the OFT 
are taken) is modeled on the Court of First Instance. Its first President 
described it as a ‘unique example of “soft harmonization” in the area 
of European procedural law.’55 At the level of institutions and statutes 
certain differences remain: for instance the rules on mergers, amended 
with the Enterprise Act 2002 are not inspired by EU Law, nor are the 
powers to conduct market investigations. 
It is not clear how far any steps the OFT took since the coming 
into force of the Competition Act 1998 has had any influence on the 
EU. First, the OFT has not been a particularly assiduous enforcer of 
competition law; second no British judge has ever issued a request for 
a preliminary ruling on a matter related to substantive competition 
                                                                                                                       
53.  Francis Jacobs, The Sovereignty of Law: The European Way, 110 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
54. Sebastian Eyre & Martin Lodge, National Tunes and a European Melody? 
Competition Law Reform in the UK and Germany, 7 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 63 (2007). 
55. Christopher Bellamy, Some Reflections on Procedure in Competition Cases, 34 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 15. 
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law emanating from a decision of the OFT/CMA. The one time a 
reference was made was in Courage v Crehan which, according to the 
dominant view in the literature, is a vital judgment that establishes an 
EU-based right to damages for competition law infringements. 56 
However, the aftermath of this specific reference did not have a happy 
ending for the plaintiff.57 
However, the approach by the OFT and the British courts 
suggests a distinctive British approach to antitrust. One must not 
exaggerate: most jurisdictions in developed states apply broadly 
similar principles – what I seek to show here are some nuances that in 
my view demonstrate something particularly British, clustered around 
the following: enforcement styles and the use of economics by the 
OFT and informed divergence by the national courts. 
1. Enforcement styles and economics by the OFT 
The OFT has issued few decisions in the field of antitrust. The 
Public Accounts Committee nudged the OFT politely in 2006 urging 
it to take more cases,58 but the report of the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills in March 2012 was less subtle: ‘The 
Government remains concerned that too few cases are taken 
forward.… relatively few decisions will lead to less deterrence and a 
diluted economic impact than one in which more cases could be 
run.’59 It is thus ironic to note that in the run-up to Brexit the OFT 
(now renamed the Competition and Markets Authority) began to 
increase its enforcement efforts.60 
There are two possible explanations for the lack of enforcement. 
One is encapsulated in the position taken by the OFT’s former Chief 
                                                                                                                       
56. Courage v. Crehan, Case C-453/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-6314. 
57. He lost after the House of Lords ruled that in determining the facts the national court 
was not bound by Commission decisions analyzing the same market but which were not 
addressing the conduct of the firm being sued by Mr Crehan. Inntrepreneur Pub Co (CPC) and 
others v. Crehan, [2006] UKHL 38. For a critical assessment, see Colleen Hanley, The 
Abandonment of Deference, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 817 (2007). The approach has been 
applied again recently in Asda Stores Ld & Ors v. Mastercard Incorporated & Ors [2017] 
EWHC 93 (Comm). 
58. “The OFT is an organisation in transition, which has yet to demonstrate that it can 
make effective use of the substantial extra resources it has been given.” House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, Enforcing Competition In Markets (2006). 
59. Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Growth, Competition and the 
Competition Regime: Government Response to Consultation (Mar. 2012) (6.17). 
60. Catherine Belton, UK’s Competition Watchdog Sharpens its Teeth Ahead of Brexit, 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017). 
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Executive that there are other enforcement techniques than 
prosecution, and that the ‘fetish around numbers of cases and high 
fines’ 61  is unwarranted. Instead, the British competition authority 
spends a number of resources in providing guidance to business to 
secure their compliance. This also happens in the aftermath of certain 
infringement decisions, where the agency explains to the industry 
how to ensure their conduct moving forward can comply with 
competition law. The resources devoted to this enforcement style take 
away from the authority’s capacity to take more cases. A recent 
example of this found in a decision against a supplier’s distribution 
agreement where in the aftermath of the decision the CMA also sent 
an open letter to suppliers clarifying the competition rules as well as 
other guidance documents for businesses to understand the role 
competition law plays in shaping distribution agreements.62 
A second reason for the lack of productivity is that the OFT tries 
to finesse the application of competition law. Its approach to resale 
price maintenance (“RPM”) provides a good instance of this. While 
agreements containing RPM clauses are deemed to be hardcore 
restraints by the Commission, and so any competition authority would 
find prosecution very easy, the officers of the OFT prefer a different 
approach. In a paper published in 2011 some OFT officials explained 
a preference for screening RPM cases to identify whether there was a 
credible theory of harm. 63  The prioritization screens were then 
implemented in deciding which RPM cases to select. 64  It is also 
notable that some of these decisions were quite lengthy and set out a 
number of fairly basic antitrust points, almost as if the OFT was 
trying to educate the parties. One wonders if this is a means of trying 
to secure better compliance.65 It has also been shown that the OFT has 
                                                                                                                       
61 . Speech, John Fingleton Competition and Growth in Europe (Oct. 10 2014), 
http://www.fingletonassociates.com/speeches/competition-growth-europe/. 
62.  Competition and Markets Authority, Bathroom Fittings Sector: Investigation Into 
Anti-Competitive Practices (May 17 2016), available at: https://www.gov.uk/cma-
cases/bathroom-fittings-sector-investigation-into-anti-competitive-practices. 
63.  Matthew Bennet et al, Resale Price Maintenance: Explaining the Controversy, and 
Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1278, 1297-98 (2011) 
64.  Unfortunately, the document attesting to their implementation has vanished from 
the web, but a reference may be found in a slide deck on file with the author. For an example 
of a decision where several filters were examined before proceeding against an RPM 
agreement see its decision in the market for mobility aids, see https://www.gov.uk/cma-
cases/investigation-into-agreements-in-the-mobility-aids-sector. 
65.  For discussion of this point, see Mathew O’Regan, United Kingdom: Pride before a 
fall in online advertising restrictions or getting away with illegal behavior that harms 
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applied a more economics-based approach in its abuse of dominance 
case law.66 This requires more resources and accounts for the relative 
paucity of cases and may account for the lower numbers. 
2. Informed Divergence by the Courts 
It is perhaps worth starting this discussion with reference to an 
Opinion by AG Jacobs where he advised national courts to avoid 
making too many references for a preliminary ruling to the Court.67 
This message has then been internalized by the British judiciary – and 
in the context of antitrust one of the arguments against making a 
reference to the Court is that frequently the difficulty in these cases 
hinge not on understanding the law, but on applying settled principles 
to new facts.68 This allows the British courts to be innovative in the 
interpretation of EU competition law.69 One example of this relates to 
vertical restraints where the anticompetitive effects are the result of 
the existence of a range of contracts similar to the one at hand, and 
where an agreement that was originally lawful becomes unlawful 
once further such agreements are entered into. The English Court of 
Appeal thus indicated that agreements may shift in and out of legality 
as the market conditions alter.70 The ECJ had never explained whether 
this was the correct way of interpreting Article 101(2) but the courts 
in England preferred to settle this on their own. 
A more recent instance where one can see critical deference is 
found in Streetmap v Google. Here the claimant argued that Google 
                                                                                                                       
vulnerable consumers?, KLUWER COMPETITION BLOG (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2014/11/18/united-kingdom-pride-before-a-fall-in-
online-advertising-restrictions-or-getting-away-with-illegal-behaviour-that-harms-vulnerable-
consumers/. 
66.  R. NAZZINI, A Welfare-Based Competition Policy Under Structuralist Constraints: 
Abuse of Dominance and OFT Practice, in TEN YEARS OF UK COMPETITION LAW REFORM 
(B. Rodger ed., 2010). 
67 .  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Wiener S. I. GmbH v. Hauptzollamt 
Emmerich, C-338/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-6497. For discussion, see M. Hoskins, Discretionary 
References: To Refer or Not to Defer?, in TRUE EUROPEAN – ESSAYS FOR JUDGE DAVID 
EDWARD (M. Hoskins & W. Robinson eds., 2003). 
68.  Professional Contractors’ Group v. Inland Revenue [2001] EWCA Civ 1945, [91].  
69.  And at times even critical of the approach of the European Courts, for example The 
Racecourse Association and others v. Office of Fair Trading finding it hard to reconcile 
certain judgments, but then interpreting the law itself rather than making a reference for a 
preliminary ruling. [2005] CAT 29, [167].  
70.  Passmore v. Morland plc [1999] 3 All ER 1005. For discussion, see G. Monti, EU 
Competition Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO EUROPEAN UNION PRIVATE LAW 292-
3 (C. Twigg-Flesner ed., 2010). 
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had abused its dominant position in the search market to exclude 
Streetmap from a downstream market where both competed to offer 
useful maps for users, by promoting Google’s maps more effectively 
that the claimant’s services. At first blush the judge had no objection 
to this allegation, since leveraging one’s dominant position from an 
upstream market to a downstream one is a common feature of many 
abuse of dominance cases.71 
However, Roth looked closely at the key ingredients of the 
concept of abuse. In particular, the judge confronted the question of 
the kind of effect that had to be shown. On this point the ECJ had 
only recently spoken in Post Danmark II. There it held that there was 
no appreciability threshold for the prohibition to apply, largely 
because the dominant undertaking was already harming competition 
by its presence that any further weakening could not be tolerated.72 
Roth J held that this approach was fine when the dominant position 
and the abuse both occurred in the same product and geographical 
market: for instance on the facts of Post Danmark 2 when the former 
state monopolist is alleged to have granted loyalty rebates to 
customers, and forcing a new entrant from a newly opened market. In 
these scenarios an aggressive application of Article 102 can 
complement the liberalization of the postal services sector. However, 
he held that when the abuse was taking place in a downstream market 
that was not dominated by anyone, this approach could not stand. In 
his view a de minimis threshold is necessary when the abuse is taking 
place in a downstream, non-dominated market, especially when 
Google’s conduct on the market where it is dominant was not 
questioned: it would be ‘perverse’ to find that it abuses its dominance 
in the downstream market without there being an appreciable 
weakening of competition in that market.73 He felt that the case law 
from the CJEU did not prevent this conclusion since it could be 
distinguished on the facts.74 
In this case the judge appears to treat the judgments of the Court 
of Justice in the way a common law judge might treat judgments from 
the same court: persuasive but not binding. Some might legitimately 
question if this is the kind of deference one should show to the 
                                                                                                                       
71.  Streetmap.EU Ltd. v. Google Inc. [2016] EWHC 253 (CH). 
72.  Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, Case C-23/14, 2015, ¶ 70-74, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CJ0023.  
73.  Id. at ¶ 98. 
74.  Id. at ¶ 97. 
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superior court. On the merits, however, the approach taken makes 
eminent sense. 
Summing up, it appears that within the EU British officials 
helped to guide two developments: an effects-based analysis of 
competitive restraints and a preference for competitive markets even 
in the provision of public services. As regards the effects-based 
approach the OFT/CMA’s practice suggests that its approach is even 
more focused on abandoning formalist approaches to competition 
law: its stance on resale price maintenance is a good illustration of 
how the harsh rule under EU Law, whereby RPM agreements are said 
to be restrictive by object, is tempered by setting up a range of filters 
to determine which RPM cases to prioritize. This investment in pre-
screening is a contributing factor to its lower productivity. We find 
similar critical deference in the way the British courts handle EU 
precedents, which may suggest that there are national variations in the 
way EU law is applied. 75  This last point suggests that the 
straitjacketing effects of EU law may be less rigid than some Brexit 
supporters might think, and that judicial conversations cold give a 
role for national courts to inform the development of EU competition 
law.76 
IV. AFTER BREXIT 
In this section, we speculate on what might happen after the UK 
withdraws from the EU. At the time of writing there is much 
uncertainty about the specific relationship that will be forged. In what 
follows we assume that the British will not join the European 
Economic Area and speculate on what impact this so-called ‘hard 
Brexit’ (by which we assume that the UK exits from the internal 
market) might entail for the two sides. 
A. Post-Brexit EU 
What have the British done for EU competition law? What might 
be lost? A distinguished expert suggested that ‘the UK made major 
contributions to the debate about the reform of the EU Merger 
                                                                                                                       
75.  For an overview of differences in the field of abuse of dominance, see P.L. Parcu, 
G. Monti & M. Botta (eds) ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN EU COMPETITION LAW – EMERGING 
TRENDS (P.L. Parcu, G. Monti & M. Botta eds., Edward Elgar 2017). 
76.  These conversations are better established in other fields of EU Law, see generally 
Chalmers, supra note 41, at 222-29. 
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Regulation in the early years of the 2000s and again to the complex 
issue of the “reform” of Article 102 TFEU later in that decade.’77 The 
reform of the merger regulation was a very technical affair, which can 
be explained briefly in this way: originally the EU merger Regulation 
allowed intervention only if the merger strengthened of created a 
dominant position, when this was likely to substantially impede 
effective competition. In contrast the UK’s Enterprise Act 2002 (and 
the US provisions) allows intervention where there is a risk that the 
merger may substantially lessen competition. The basic difference is 
that the latter is more in line with the way economists review a 
merger, focusing on the impact of a transaction and not on the 
competitive structure of the market post-merger. In 2004 the Merger 
Regulation was redrafted so that the substantive test is aligned to the 
standards in the UK and US.78 The reform of Article 102 is an attempt 
by the Directorate General for Competition to depart from the highly 
criticized approach that it took (and the Court has sanctioned) and 
develop tests for illegality grounded on mainstream economics. 79 
Thus the ideas underpinning these moves by the Commission have the 
same inspiration as those that we have seen informed the approach of 
Brittan and Jacobs. 
However, the claim that the UK had a hand in these two 
developments might overplay British influence. It was an Italian 
Commissioner (Mario Monti) who pressed for both: his training as an 
economist probably made him sympathetic to the use of a more 
economics-based approach.80 Moreover, if one reviews the literature 
it appears that the advocates for reform are a cosmopolitan set of 
practicing lawyers, economists and scholars. Even the Merger Task 
Force, which was instituted to specialize in mergers, contained a 
number of scholars from a diverse range of national traditions who 
                                                                                                                       
77.  R. Whish, Brexit and EU Competition Policy, 7 J. OF EUR. COMPETITION L. & 
PRAC. 297 (2016). 
78.  For discussion, see A. Oldale & J. Padilla, EU Merger Assessment of Upward 
Pricing Pressure: Making Sense of UPP, GUPPI, and the Like, 4 J. OF EUR. COMPETITION, L. 
& PRAC. 375 (2013). 
79.  See generally M. Marquis & E. Rousseva, Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change 
for Assessing Exclusionary Conduct under Article 102 TFEU, 4 J. OF EUR,. COMPETITION L. 
AND PRAC. 32 (2013). 
80.  N. Levy, Mario Monti’s Legacy in EC Merger Control, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L 99 (2005). 
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readily embraced the more economics-based approach.81 Thus it is 
hard to see documentary evidence of the major contribution Richard 
Whish says the UK has made in the twenty-first century.82 
On the contrary, the discussion in Part III suggests that once 
Lord Brittan left the Commission, the move towards a greater 
economics-based analysis of competition law was fixed. Since then 
one could rely on a much wider constituency of EU officials who are 
committed to taking the modern approach to antitrust forward. None 
of the Commissioners that have succeeded Brittan have altered the 
direction of competition policy. Karel van Miert, a socialist, might 
have been expected to revert to a more dirigiste style, but barring a 
few decisions he kept the course maintained by Brittan; 83  Mario 
Monti accelerated the development of a more economic approach;84 
Neelie Kroes kept insisting on the importance of competitive markets 
even during the deep recession that started in 2007, 85  Joaquim 
Almunia and the present incumbent Margarethe Vestager have not 
changed course either.86 
The Court remains a more difficult entity to understand, which 
may suggest the judges are divided on the application of competition 
law. The judges were at one in rejecting the supposed demotion of 
competition law in the Lisbon Treaty but have steered an ambiguous 
                                                                                                                       
81.  The Merger Task Force was slowly disbanded starting in 2003, in the aftermath of 
significant defeats of Commission decisions at the hand of the General Court. See N. Levy EU 
Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence, 26(2) WORLD COMPETITION 195 (2003). 
82.  It is fair to say that senior OFT members contributed in conferences debating the 
reform of the merger regulation and that German officials seemed opposed to the reform. See 
for example: J. Vickers, How to Reform the EC Merger Test?, in RC MERGER CONTROL: A 
MAJOR REFORM PROCESS (G. Drauz & M. Reynolds eds. Richmond, IBA, 2003); J. Fingleton 
& D. Nolan, Mind the gap. La riforma del regolamento comunitario sulle concentrazioni, 2 
MERCATO CONCORRENZA REGOLE 209 (2003). At any rate, some have argued that the reform 
of the Regulation ‘has had little if any impact on the outcome of merger decisions since 2004.’ 
S. BISHOP & M. WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION LAW 360 (3rd ed. 2010). This 
is also confirmed by other studies, for instance T. Reeves & F. Dethmers, EU Merger Control 
Since the Introduction of the 2004 Reforms, 2013 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 153 (B. Hawk ed. 
2014). 
83. K. VAN MIERT, LE MARCHÉ ET LE POUVOIR: SOUVENIRS D’UN 
COMMISSAIRE EUROPÉEN (Éditions Racine, 2000).  
84.  M. Monti, European Competition for the 21st Century, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 
1602 (2000). 
85.  N. Kroes, Competition, the Crisis and the Road to Recovery, Address Before the 
Economic Club of Toronto (Mar. 20, 2009). 
86.  Charlemagne, The Enforcer, THE ECONOMIST (May 2 2015) (noting her interest in 
procedural openness as opposed to her predecessor’s preference for the use of commitment 
decisions to resolve anticompetitive concerns). 
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path when asked how far the interpretation of competition law should 
be based exclusively on the welfare effects of restrictive practices.87 
At the level of Advocates General, Nils Whal is perhaps even more 
radical than AG Jacobs: in his Opinion in Cartes Bancaires he has 
nearly succeeded in introducing a truncated rule of reason in Article 
101, and the Court largely followed him;88 in Intel the approach he 
suggested would steer enforcement along the lines the Commission 
wishes. 89  Thus, the judicial pendulum may swing towards the 
economic way suggested by the British. 
B. Post-Brexit UK 
A working group has been created to consider the impact of 
Brexit on UK competition policy (the Brexit Competition Law 
Working Group): it has published an issues paper in 2016 and has 
received some written responses.90 The paper rightly notes that should 
the UK join the EEA the result is relatively simple: little will change 
save that the UK will lose a formal voice in the shaping of EU 
competition policy. It then considers short term and long term matters 
that should be discussed in case Brexit severs the links with the EU in 
a more profound way. 
Here we take a different tack than the practical one which the 
members of the working group elected. There are two themes that can 
be considered in gazing into the future of Britain when we listen to 
the main claims in favor of leaving the EU: one is the wish to ‘take 
back control’91 of national policies and the other may be reduced to 
the phrase ‘global Britain’, the wish to see the UK open to trade with 
one and all.92 Below we explore how far these two themes (taking 
back control and global Britain) might play out in competition law. 
                                                                                                                       
87.   Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB et al., Case C-52/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-
564, ¶¶ 20-22 (rejecting the demotion of competition law); see Chalmers, supra note 41, 1046-
1050 for an assessment of recent case law, showing how some cases point towards a more 
effects-based approach and others towards retaining the current framework. 
88.   Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v. Commission, C-67/13, 2014, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/SUM/?uri=CELEX:62013CJ0067. 
89.  Intel Corporation v. Commission, C-413/14 P, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
celex.jsf?celex=62014CC0413&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=. 
90.  The issues paper and responses are available at www.bclwg.org. 
91.  A. Runswick, Just who is it taking back control with Brexit?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 
30, 2017). 
92.  Seàn Molloy, Global Britain’: Theresa May’s Ersatz Vision, THE DISORDER OF 
THING (Jan. 31, 2017), https://thedisorderofthings.com/2017/01/31/global-britain-theresa-
mays-ersatz-vision/. 
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1. Legal Links to the EU 
Any person wishing for hard Brexit with the EU would, upon 
reading sections 10 and 60 of the Competition Act 1998 immediately 
see these sections as prime targets for deletion as they fly in the face 
of domestic control. Section 60(1) of the Competition Act 1998 seeks 
to ensure that questions arising in interpreting this Act ‘are dealt with 
in a manner which is consistent with the treatment of corresponding 
questions arising in Community law.’ Section 60(2) then imposes a 
duty on the competition authority and national courts to ensure that 
there is no inconsistency between British law and the principles laid 
down by the European Court and any decision of that Court. And 
section 60(3) provides that competition authorities and courts must 
have regard to decisions and statements of the Commission. Clearly 
this relinquishes far too much control, and whatever its impact has 
been, it has to be repealed because it makes British judges subject to 
EU institutions. Section 10 is equally offensive: section 10(1) codifies 
the case law of the ECJ by which Commission decisions bind national 
authorities and section 10(2) provides for a system of parallel 
exemptions: if an agreement which does not affect trade between 
member States would otherwise fall within the scope of a Block 
Exemption Regulation then it is also exempted under the Competition 
Act 1998.93 
From the perspective of those wanting to take back control these 
two sections clearly have to go. More generally, one might wonder if 
the Euro-skeptics might take offence that the language of the two 
prohibitions in the Act mirror Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Thus one 
might even argue that the scheme of the statute as a whole has to be 
got rid of, even if hardly any of the provisions in the Competition Act 
1998 are due to a requirement coming from EU Law. Moreover, some 
think that the interpretation of competition rules remains far too 
formalistic in the EU and that taking back control would allow the 
UK to regulate markets with a more effective approach to cases.94 
However, there is a tension with the other Brexit desiderata: 
global Britain. One of the arguments the vast majority of competition 
                                                                                                                       
93.  Competition Act 1998, c. 41 (Eng.) To be precise it is exempted from the Chapter 1 
prohibition, which is the equivalent of Article 101 TFEU. 
94 .  John Vickers, The Economic Consequences of Brexit, OXFORD REVIEW OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.bclwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
Vickers-British-Academy-7-Dec-16.pdf. 
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lawyers press is the importance of a convergent approach to the 
interpretation of competition law.95 Imitating the EU is simply a way 
to favor business wishing to operate across the European Economic 
Area. As many others have pointed out in various fora, there is only 
so much control one can have of national laws in a global economy. 
Accordingly it may be prudent not to jettison much of the architecture 
that links the UK to the EU, in order to safeguard the reasonable 
expectations of businesses in the long term.96 Indeed, there are aspects 
of the Government’s White Paper, which suggest that, at least in the 
medium term post-Brexit much of the EU acquis will be simply 
copied into domestic legislation to offer businesses a seamless 
transition. Only in the longer term will revisions be considered.97 
However, even in the long term it is not easy to see what major 
changes could be brought to UK competition Law: as we have shown 
above the UK has already been able to diverge slightly from the 
approach favored by the EU in discrete instances. Is a more radical 
agenda likely? At the present moment, it remains to be seen how far 
the global Britain policy may be undermined by a policy to protect 
domestic businesses. In the summer of 2016 Theresa May indicated 
that takeovers of national firms would be subjected to tighter scrutiny: 
“A proper industrial strategy wouldn’t automatically stop the sale of 
British firms to foreign ones, but it should be capable of stepping in to 
defend a sector that is as important as pharmaceuticals is to Britain.”98 
It is not clear how far this statement (made while she was running for 
the leadership of the party) will translate into policy. 
2. Economic Links to the EU 
As discussed above, for mergers that have an EU dimension, the 
Commission has exclusive competence. For global deals the 
                                                                                                                       
95.  See David J. Gerber, Comparative Law and Global Regulatory Convergence: The 
Example of Competition Law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 120 
(Maurice Adams and Jacob Bomhoff eds., 2012). 
96.   See Lord Steyn, Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest 
Men, 113 LQR 433, 439 (1997). This is also a recurring leitmotif used when explaining the 
virtues of English contract law. 
97.  Department for Exiting the European Union, LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2017, Cm. 9446, at 7. It is ironic 
indeed that before EU law can be got rid of in the UK, the government proposes to transpose a 
significant part of that law into domestic law, retaining thus the need to engage with 
developments in EU legislation until such a time as the legislation is substituted. 
98.  Theresa May to back new investment vetting system, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016). 
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Commission and its US counterpart have established a framework for 
cooperation that normally works very smoothly so that the two sides 
agree on the reasons why a merger should be challenged and on the 
remedies necessary to make sure that a merger does not harm 
competition. 99  On occasion the discussion includes other major 
jurisdictions.100 Sir John Vickers (a member of the Brexit working 
group) has indicated that ‘duplication of merger control will have 
substantial costs both for businesses and the authorities. Given the 
size and complexity of international mergers, the resource 
implications for the CMA could be major.’101 One might imagine that 
a bilateral agreement like that with the US would serve Britain well. 
However, we would like to suggest a more radical solution: can the 
UK not, most of the time, free ride on the Commission’s merger 
decisions? 
Consider this: at the moment, if a merger has an EU dimension 
the Commission will look at the impact of the merger across the 
relevant EU markets. If a Member State believes that the merger has a 
specific effect in its jurisdiction it can ask the Commission that the 
merger (or parts of that transaction) should be referred to that 
authority.102 As things stand, there have only been 112 requests for 
referral out of over 6000 mergers notified.103 It suggests that for most 
transactions with an EU dimension, Commission scrutiny will likely 
protect the UK market too. Thus, a different modality of cooperation 
could be explored that allows the UK to intervene in mergers that 
affect the UK when the national authority it is not convinced that the 
global solution likely to emerge from the Commission is unsuitable 
for its market. This would comport fewer resources than vetting all 
mergers that have an EU dimension. One might wonder whether a 
similar approach might be implemented also for the purposes of 
restrictive practices: this would not oblige the CMA to agree with the 
                                                                                                                       
99.      Decision of the Council and the Commission of 10 April 1995 concerning the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the 
United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws, O.J. (L 95) 38. 
100.    See e.g. OECD, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement: 
Remedies in Cross-Border Merger Cases (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/
officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?
cote=DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)6&docLanguage=En. 
101.       Vickers, supra note 94, at 5. 
102.   Council Regulation 139/04/EC on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. L 24/1, art. 9. 
103.     See European Commission Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/sta
tistics.pdf. 
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conclusions of the Commission, but it would allow it to depart from 
those instances where it considers that the Commission’s approach is 
not addressing relevant market failures. This system is likely to be 
cumbersome but it may serve to avoid the CMA’s scarce resources 
being deployed to duplicate all actions taken by the Commission. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The British influence suggested in this chapter is perhaps 
predictable: the British pushed for an approach to competition law 
that is based on testing the economic effects of the commercial 
activities under scrutiny, and favored freer markets. In pursuing these 
lines, they challenged the view that restrictions to competition were to 
be found when conduct harmed the competitive process simpliciter, 
and they challenged the state’s role in the provision of utilities. This is 
what one might have expected even without being an expert in 
competition law. 
These effects began to make themselves felt from the late 1980s. 
Revolutionary then, they are now embedded in the EU’s system. As 
suggested above, it was with the internal market project that the 
British managed to insinuate a free market based regulatory approach 
within the EU more generally and the economic transitions occurring 
then facilitated a push towards a vision of competition law that we 
find ordinary today: a technocratic venture to safeguard economic 
welfare. That this approach has now become mainstream is probably 
due less to the influence of the British, however, than on factors that 
facilitated a particular vision of antitrust since that time. 
In large part, this vision became the global standard as a result of 
epistemic communities that are not based on nationality but are 
clusters based on expertise and a shared vision for antitrust,104 like the 
regulars at annual events like the Fordham Competition Law 
Institute’s September conference, or at the European University 
Institute’s annual competition workshops in June.105 
                                                                                                                       
104.  See Frans van Waarden & Michaela Drahos, Courts and (epistemic) communities 
in the convergence of competition policies, 9 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 913, 914 (2002) 
(considering the Europeanisation of German, Austrian and Dutch competition law). 
105.   Jean-Francois Bellis, After Forty Years: The development of European Competition 
Law – Views from Fordham, 2014 FORDHAM COMP. L. INST. 545 (2014); John Temple Lang, 
After Forty Years: The Development of European Competition Law – Views from Fordham, 
2014 FORDHAM COMP. L. INST. 555 (2014). 
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The above suggests that what we have referred to as the 
“British” vision of competition law is likely to continue to influence 
the way the Commission operates even post-Brexit.106 However the 
future of competition law in the UK is much less certain as 
policymakers will have to navigate the difficult path between taking 
back control and re-establishing a global presence for Britain in the 
world. 
 
   
                                                                                                                       
106.   See Jean-Francoise Verstrynge, Current Antitrust Policy Issues in the EEC: Some 
Reflections on the Second Generation of Competition Policy, 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 
673, 681 (1984). Indeed, one can even find traces of the more economic approach in the early 
1980s. The author was a member of the cabinet of Frans Andriessen (who served as 
competition commissioner between 1981 and 1985) and noted that already by then the 
Commission was using more economics to assess restrictive practices. 
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